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ABSTRACT
Federated Learning (FL) enables a large number of users to jointly
learn a shared machine learning (ML) model, coordinated by a
centralized server, where the data is distributed across multiple
devices. This approach enables the server or users to train and learn
an ML model using gradient descent, while keeping all the training
data on users’ devices. We consider training an ML model over
a mobile network where user dropout is a common phenomenon.
Although federated learning was aimed at reducing data privacy
risks, the ML model privacy has not received much attention.
In this work, we present PrivFL, a privacy-preserving system
for training (predictive) linear and logistic regression models and
oblivious predictions in the federated setting, while guaranteeing
data and model privacy as well as ensuring robustness to users
dropping out in the network. We design two privacy-preserving
protocols for training linear and logistic regression models based
on an additive homomorphic encryption (HE) scheme and an ag-
gregation protocol. Exploiting the training algorithm of federated
learning, at the core of our training protocols is a secure multiparty
global gradient computation on alive users’ data. We analyze the
security of our training protocols against semi-honest adversaries.
As long as the aggregation protocol is secure under the aggregation
privacy game and the additive HE scheme is semantically secure,
PrivFL guarantees the users’ data privacy against the server, and
the server’s regression model privacy against the users. We demon-
strate the performance of PrivFL on real-world datasets and show
its applicability in the federated learning system.
KEYWORDS
Privacy-preserving computations, Predictive analysis, Federated
learning, Machine learning
1 INTRODUCTION
Due to their powerful capabilities, machine learning (ML) algo-
rithms are deployed in various applications, from mobile applica-
tions to massive-scale data centers for serving various tasks such as
predictive analysis, classification, and clustering. Companies such
as browser, telecom, web services, edge computing, and advertise-
ment collect a huge amount of data from users to learn ML models
for improving quality of services and user experiences, and for
providing intelligent services. Predictive analytics is a fundamental
task in machine learning, which has many applications ranging
from advertisement analytics to financial modeling, supply chain
analysis, to health analytics. A common approach to the data ana-
lytics is that users send their data to a centralized server where the
server executes machine learning algorithms on collected data. A
major drawback of this approach is that the transparency of data
processing at the server is not clear, and such centralized servers
(or Artificial Intelligence (AI) platforms) are easy targets for hack-
ers (e.g., AI.type [1], ). Recently the European Union’s General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) mandates companies to exhibit
transparency in handling personal data, data processing, etc.
Federated learning [6, 46] is a promising distributed machine
learning approach, and its goal is to collaboratively learn a shared
model, coordinated by a (centralized) server, while the training
data remains on user devices. In federated learning, an ML model
on users’ data is learnt in an iterative way, which has four steps:
1) a set of users is chosen by the server to compute an updated
model; 2) each user computes an updated model on its local data;
3) the updated local models are sent to the server; and 4) the server
aggregates these local models to construct a global model. With
the advancement of 5G, the federated learning approach will be an
attractive solution for machine leaning in edge computing.
With the growing concern of data privacy, federated learning
aimed at reducing data privacy risks by avoiding storing data at
a centralized server. In privacy-preserving machine learning, two
major privacy concerns are the user input privacy and the ML
model privacy [23, 56]. However, the model privacy in the federated
learning setting has not received much attention. Besides the model
leaking sensitive information about training data, the model privacy
must also be protected against unauthorized use or misuse. For
instance, a covert user belonging to one organization participating
in a federated training process may disclose the trained model to
another organization, which may lead to obtaining a better model
by further training it on their dataset or may use it as a prediction
service to do business. Although the training data remains on the
device, we have found certain scenarios in which the local gradient
computation leaks private information about locally stored data (see
Section 3.2).
In this work, we consider a federated machine learning setting
in which a server that coordinates the machine learning process
wishes to learn an ML model on a joint dataset belonging to a set
of mobile users. We consider both the mobile users’ data privacy
against the server, and the model privacy against the users in the
federated setting. A user dropout is an important consideration
in mobile applications, recently considered in [7, 44]. Especially,
during the training phase which is a computationally intensive and
time consuming task, it can happen any time from the network. Our
goal is to design secure and dropout-robust training protocols for
predictive analytics for mobile applications where, in this work, we
consider two fundamental regression models, namely linear/ridge
regression and logistic regression.
1
ar
X
iv
:2
00
4.
02
26
4v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  5
 A
pr
 20
20
Kalikinkar Mandal and Guang Gong
In a recent work, the authors of [7] considered a general prob-
lem of secure aggregation for privacy-preserving machine learn-
ing in the federated setting. In a follow-up work, the authors of
[44] presented an improved protocol for secure aggregation. No
complete training protocol for any machine learning algorithm
is developed in [7, 44]. Privacy-preserving training for linear and
logistic regressions is not a new problem. Secure training protocols
for linear regression have been proposed, e.g., in [24, 49] where,
unlike ours, a set of users participating in the training process
is connected on a stable network. Secure training protocols for
Machine-Learning-as-a-Service (MLaaS) for logistic regression are
proposed in [2, 8, 39, 63]. Although several solutions have been
proposed for linear and logistic regressions using somewhat or fully
homomorphic encryption (SWHE or FHE) [26], garbled circuit [61],
or hybrid techniques e.g., in [47], until now, the regression model
training over mobile networks has not been considered, under the
scenario of users dropping out. Moreover, the suitability of expen-
sive cryptographic primitives such as SWHE or FHE on mobile
devices has not been studied. Our goal is to design protocols us-
ing lightweight crypto-primitives and schemes suitable for mobile
devices in both training and prediction phases.
1.1 Our Contributions
We design, analyze, and evaluate PrivFL, a system for privacy-
preserving training and oblivious prediction of regression models,
namely linear/ridge regression and logistic regression in the feder-
ated setting.
Dropout-robust regression training protocols.We design two
privacy-preserving protocols – one is for a linear regression and
another is for a logistic regression – for training a regression model
over a mobile network while providing robustness in the event of
users dropping out. In a nutshell, our privacy-preserving protocol
for multiparty regression training consists of multiple (parallel)
two-party shared local gradient computation protocols, followed
by a global gradient share-reconstruction protocol (see Section 4.2).
In our protocol, the users and the server execute the following
three steps: 1) a shared local gradient computation protocol is run
between the server and a user to securely compute two (additive)
shares of the local gradient on the user’s data to prevent the input
leakage, even if the user has a single data point; 2) the server and
all alive users execute an aggregation protocol to construct one
share of the global gradient; and 3) the server computes the second
share of the global gradient from its local gradient shares. This
offers a great flexibility for computing the global gradients robustly.
Our regression training protocols are developed using an additive
homomorphic encryption scheme and a secure aggregation proto-
col built using practical crypto-primitives. We also show how to
obliviously compute regression models for prediction services for
the future use of the trained models by the users.
Security.We prove the security of the training protocol, in three
different threat models, against semi-honest adversaries in the sim-
ulation paradigm. As our privacy-preserving training protocol is
built upon several subprotocols, we first prove the security of the
shared local gradient computation protocol for linear and logis-
tic regression models. We formally show that the security of the
training protocol is based on the semantic security of the additive
HE scheme that guarantees the server’s model privacy and the
aggregation privacy game, as defined in [11], which ensures users’
data privacy.
Experimental evaluation. We implement and evaluate the effi-
ciency of PrivFL for training linear and logistic regression models
on eleven real-world datasets from the UCI ML repository [18]. In
our experiment, we use the Joye-Libert (JL) cryptosystem [33] to re-
alize the additive HE scheme as its ciphertext expansion is 2× lesser
and its ciphertext operations faster, when compared to Paillier’s
[51]. We implement an aggregation protocol that is a compilation of
the protocols of [7] and [44]. As machine learning algorithms work
on floating-point numbers, we show how to encode floating-point
numbers for cryptographic operations, and how to decode results
obtained after applying crypto-operations. For training linear (resp.
logistic) regression models, we perform experiments on 6 (resp. 5)
different datasets of various sizes and dimensions. The accuracy of
the trained models obtained by our protocols is very close to that of
the model trained using sklearn (no security) [52]. We present the
benchmark results for the execution time, data transfer, and storage
overhead for cryptographic operations to train regression models.
We provide a comparison of our scheme with other approaches in
Section 6.
2 PRELIMINARIES
Here, we briefly describe the regression algorithms, namely linear,
and logistic regressions, federated learning, and the cryptographic
schemes and protocols that we use to build our new protocols.
Basic notations.We denote the message space by Z2k , a ring of
2k elements, and E by an additive HE encryption scheme. x =
(x1, · · · ,xn ),xi ∈ Z2k denotes an n dimensional vector over Z2k .
• For x = (x1, · · · ,xn ), E(x) = (E(x1), · · · ,E(xn )).
• E(x) · E(y) = (E(x1) · E(y1), · · · ,E(xn ) · E(yn ))
• E(x)y = (E(x1y1), · · · ,E(xnyn ))
• For θ = (θ0,θ1, · · · ,θn ), θ · x = θ0 +∑ni=1 θixi .
2.1 Overview of Regression Algorithms
We now describe three regression algorithms and the gradient
descent algorithm for the training process. LetD = {(x(i),y(i))}di=1
be a training dataset with labeled output y(i) = h(θ ,x(i)) and input
x(i) = (x (i)1 ,x
(i)
2 , · · · ,x
(i)
n ), where h is the regression algorithm, θ
is the model, and n is the dimension of x. The task in the training
process is to learn the model θ , given D and h.
Gradient Descent Algorithm. Gradient descent (GD) is an iter-
ative optimization algorithm for minimizing a cost function. Given a
datasetD, the cost function is defined as J (θ ) = 1|B |
∑
(x,y)∈B C(θ , (x,y))
where C(, ·, ) is a cost function and B ⊆ D. An optimal θ is com-
puted iteratively as
θ i+1 ← θ i − η∇J (θ i ), i ≥ 0
where θ0 is initialized with a random value or all-zero, η is the
learning rate, and ∇J is the gradient of J over B.
Federated Learning. Federated learning enables a large number
of users to collaboratively learn a model while keeping all train-
ing data on their devices where the model is trained under the
coordination of a central server [41, 45]. We assume that there
arem users, denoted by Pi , with a set of data points, denoted by
2
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Di . The cost function for the joint dataset D = ∪mi=1Di is given
by J (θ ) = ∑mi=1 did Fi (θ ) where Fi (θ ) = 1di ∑(x,y)∈Di C(θ , (x,y))
and d =
∑m
i=1 di . The model update on the total training set D is
performed as [45]
θ i+1 ← θ i − η
m∑
j=1
dj
d
∇Fj (θ i ), i ≥ 0
where ∇Fj is the local gradient value onDj . In federated averaging
[45], the users are chosen randomly.
Linear Regression. For a linear regression model, the function
h(·, ·) is an affine function, which is defined as h(θ ,x(i)) = θ ·x(i) =
θ0 +
∑n
j=1 θ jx
(i)
j . The model parameter θ is obtained by optimizing
the following cost function
J (θ ) = 1
d
d∑
i=1
(h(θ ,x(i)) − y(i))2.
Ridge Regression. For the ridge regression, the function h is the
same as the function of linear regression, but the model parameter
is obtained by optimizing the following cost function
J (θ ) = 1
d
d∑
i=1
(h(θ ,x(i)) − y(i))2 + λ | |θ | |2
where λ is the regularization parameter.
Logistic Regression. The logistic regression is a binary linear
classifier, which maps an input x(i) from the feature space to a
value in [0, 1] as follows:
h(θ ,x(i)) = σ (θ · x(i)) = 1
1 + e−(
∑n
i=j θix
(i )
j +θ0)
where σ (z) = 11+e−z is the sigmoid function. The binary class is
decided based on a threshold value.
For the logistic regression, the model parameter θ is obtained
by optimizing the following log-likelihood cost function
J (θ ) = − 1
d
d∑
i=1
y(i) log(h(θ ,x(i))) + (1 − y(i)) log(1 − h(θ ,x(i))).
2.2 Multiparty Federated Regression Training
and Oblivious Prediction
Multiparty Gradient Computation. Assume that there are m
users, and each user has a datasetDi , 1 ≤ i ≤ m. A server wishes to
learn a regressionmodelθ on the joint datasetD = D1∪· · ·∪Dm ={(x(i),y(i))} (horizontally distributed). To train a model based on
the gradient descent algorithm, the server jointly computes the
gradientω on D as
ω = (ω0,ω1, · · · ,ωn ) = ∇θ J (θ ) = GD(θ ,D,d)
where d = |D|, ω0 = ∑di=1 e(i), ωj = ∑di=1 e(i)x (i)j , 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
e(i) = h(θ ,x(i)) −y(i) and h is a (linear, ridge, or logistic) regression
function.We denote the gradient computation on a single data point
(x(i),y(i)) by err(i) = f (θ , (x(i),y(i))) = (e(i), e(i)x (i)1 , · · · , e(i)x
(i)
n )
with e(i) = h(θ ,x(i)) − y(i). Knowing the model θ , each user can
compute the local gradient ωi on Di as ωi = ∑(x,y)∈Di err(i) =∑
(x,y)∈Di f (θ , (x,y)). Thus, the global gradient can be written as
ω =
∑m
i=1ωi =
∑d
j=1 err
(j). Using the gradient ω over D, the
server can update the model as θ ← θ − ηd ·ω for linear and logistic
regressions, and θ ← (1 − 2λη)θ − 2η · ω for ridge regression
for some regularization parameter λ. Secure gradient computation
enables the server to learn onlyω, while ensuring users’ input (Di )
privacy against the server, and the server’s model privacy against
the users.
Oblivious Regression Prediction. Oblivious prediction for neu-
ral networks was introduced in [42]. An oblivious prediction for
regression models is defined as follows. Assume that the server
holds a (private) regression model θ , and a user has a private input
x and wishes to learn the predicted value h(θ ,x) for a regression
function h with model θ . In an oblivious prediction computation,
the user will learn only the predicted value h(θ ,x) without leaking
any information about x to the server, and the user should not
learn any information about θ , except what can be learnt from the
output.
2.3 Cryptographic Tools
We now provide a description of the cryptographic schemes that
we will use to construct our protocols.
AdditiveHomomorphic Encryption.An additive homomorphic
encryption (HE) scheme consists of a tuple of four algorithms,
denoted as HE = (KeyGen, Enc, Eval,Dec) where
• KeyGen: Given a security parameter ν , it generates a pair of
private and public keys (pk, sk) ← KeyGen(1ν ).
• Enc: It is a randomize algorithm, denoted by E, takes the
public key pk , a random coin r and the messagem ∈ Z2k as
input, and outputs a ciphertext c = E(pk ;m, r ).
• Eval: It supports the following operations on ciphertexts:
1) Addition: Add(E(x),E(y)) = E(x + y); and 2) Constant
multiplication: ConstMul(E(x), z) = E(xz).
• Dec: The algorithm, denoted by D, takes the secret key sk
and a ciphertext c as input, and outputs a plaintext message
m = D(sk ; c).
We use an additive HE scheme that is semantically secure, and
Add(, ) and ConstMul(, ) are ciphertext multiplication and expo-
nentiation operations, respectively.
Secure Aggregation Protocol.We will use a secure aggregation
protocol that can handle the dropout scenario as well as no dropout
in an aggregated-sum computation. We call this protocol a dropout-
enabled aggregation protocol, denoted by πDeA. A dropout-enabled
aggregation protocol accepts as input a set of usersU, their private
inputs {xu }u ∈U , the total number of usersm, and the threshold
security parameter t , and outputs xsum , and a set of alive users
Ua ⊆ U participated in the sum computation, i.e.,
(Ua ,xsum ) ← πDeA
(U, {xu }u ∈U ,m, t )
where xsum =
∑
u ∈Ua xu if |Ua | ≥ t , and ⊥ otherwise. Note
that the aggregation scheme is secure under a coalition of up to
(t −1) users in the system. Such protocols with the dropout-enabled
property have been investigate recently in [7, 44]. For more details,
see [7, 44]. These aggregation protocols need to establish a pair of
pairwise keys: one key will be used for realizing an authenticated
channel, and another key will be used to encrypt private inputs. We
3
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provide a brief background on the cryptographic primitives that
are needed to construct the πDeA protocol in Appendix A.
3 OUR SYSTEM MODEL AND GOALS
In this section, we describe the system model, its goals, and possible
privacy leakage in the existing multiparty gradient computation.
3.1 System Model and Trust
System model. We consider a system in the federated learning
setting introduced in [6, 41]. In this model, the system consists of
two types of parties: a server and a set of mobile users or parties
connected in mobile network, where the server conducts the regres-
sion training process on mobile users’ data. The users may dropout
any time from the system, as recently considered in [7, 44].
Assume that there arem mobile users in the system, and each
user has a unique identity in [m] = {1, 2, · · · ,m}. We denote the
server by S , and a user by Pi , i ∈ [m]. Each user Pi holds a dataset
with high-dimensional points, denoted byDi = {(x(j),y(j))} where
|Di | ≥ 1. We have the following system goals:
• Dropout-robust secure regression training:The first goal
of our system is to enable the server training a regression
model θ (e.g., linear, ridge or logistic) over the combined
dataset D = D1 ∪ · · · ∪ Dm , i.e., θ ← Traning(h,D,m),
while allowing user dropout any time in the system, and
ensuring mobile users’ input privacy and the servers’ model
privacy where h is the regression algorithm (see Section 2.2).
• Oblivious prediction:The second goal is to enable amobile
user learn the predicted output y = h(θ ,x) on its private
input x, corresponding to a regression model θ , without
leaking any information about x to the server and about θ
to the user.
Figure 1 provides an overview of our system and approach to
achieve system goals. The main challenges in the training phase
are:
• Correctness: For correct inputs of the users, the protocol for
the regression training should output the correct model. We
claim no correctness of the regression model if any user uses
an incorrect input or the server manipulates the model in
the training phase.
• Privacy: Our system has aimed at protecting users’ inputs
privacy and the server’s model privacy. The server should
learn no information about mobile users’ private inputs in
Di . Similarly, the users should not learn anything about the
model θ , except what they can infer from the output.
• Efficiency: As mobile users do not send the private inputs out
of the devices, they should perform a minimal work, and the
server should perform the majority of work in the training
phase. The computational and communication costs of the
training protocol should be minimal.
Threatmodel. In our system, we consider semi-honest adversaries
(inside adversary) where a group of mobile users and/or the server
compromised by an adversary follow and observe the prescribed
actions of the protocol and aim at learning unintended information
about θ or honest users’Di from the execution of the protocol. We
consider three different threat models: 1) users-only adversary; 2)
server-only adversary; and 3) users-server adversary. We assume
the training is conducted in a synchronous way (each iteration
within a time interval of length ∆), meaning all users use the correct
model to compute the local gradient and the server updates the
model consistently at every round of the model update.
3.2 Privacy Leakage and Model Privacy
Input privacy leakage from local gradient.When a user holds a
single data point (x,y), i.e.,Dj =
{(x,y)}, the gradient computation
on Dj , denoted byω = (ω0,ω1, · · · ,ωn ), leaks information about
the private input x as ω0 = (h(θ ,x) −y) and ωj = (h(x,θ ) −y)x j =
ω0 · x j , 1 ≤ j ≤ n, where h is a regression function. In the cases of
stochastic gradient descent and federated averaging algorithm with
|Di | = 1 [45], this directly allows the server to recover x j fromω
forω , 0.
In the application of smart grid data aggregation, an analysis
on aggregation is performed in [11], which experimentally finds
privacy leakage in the aggregate-sum when it has a small number
of inputs. According to the analysis of [11], ωj =
∑di
l=1(h(θ ,x(l )) −
y(i))x (l )j and ω0 =
∑di
l=1(h(θ ,x(l )) − y(l )) may leak information
about x(i) when di is small. In mobile applications, when mobile
devices do not have enough data, it may compromise the privacy of
the input dataset Di . In this work, PrivFL enables mobile users’ to
train a regression model without leaking their privacy, even when
|Di | = 1 and d = ∑di is large enough to protect input privacy.
Model privacy of federated learning. In federated learning, a
substantial focus has been put on users’ data privacy. The authors
of [45] mentioned about achieving the model privacy using differ-
ential privacy techniques [20]. However, there is no such concrete
proposal, and it is also not known the accuracy of the training pro-
cess after applying such techniques. PrivFL takes the secure MPC
approach to provide the ML model privacy as well as users’ data
privacy.
4 OUR REGRESSION PROTOCOLS
The key objective of this work is to develop secure training proto-
cols for regression models based on cryptographic primitives suit-
able for mobile devices as well as robust against the user dropout
scenario. As the training process involves a pre-processing of the
training data, called the scaling or normalization of the dataset, we
show how to securely perform this using an aggregation protocol
while ensuring the dropout scenario. We start by presenting the
secure scaling operation.
4.1 Dropout-robust Secure Scaling Operation
Scaling a dataset is performed by computing the mean and standard
deviation of the dataset. Given the set of numbers {xi } of sizem,
the scaling is performed as xi ← xi−µσ where µ = 1m
∑m
i=1 xi and
σ =
√
1
m−1
∑m
i=1(xi − µ)2. For a high-dimensional dataset D =
D1∪ · · ·∪Dm from usersU, the scaling operation is performed by
scaling individual components of each data point. Note that scaling
is performed only on x(i) in D. Let x(i) = (x (i)1 ,x (i)2 , · · · ,x (i)n ) be
an n-dimensional data point. The mean of the x(i) component of
D of size d is given by µ = (µ1, · · · , µn ) where µ j = 1d
∑d
i=1 x
(i)
j ,
and the standard deviation is given by σ = (σ1, · · · ,σn ) where
4
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• • •
User
r1 r2 rm−1 rm
D1 D2 Dm−1 Dm
D = D1 ∪ · · · ∪ Dm
E(θ )
E(s1)
E(θ ) E(θ ) E(θ )
E(s2) E(sm−1) E(sm )si − ri = ωi
(1) Training regression models
Update model:
θ ← θ − ηd
∑d
i=1ωi
ω =
∑
si −∑ ri
Server1) Establish pairwise key
2) Scaling the dataset D
3) Training the model θ
- Send enc. model E(θ )
- Securely compute ω
Model: θ Evaluating on x:
y = h(θ ,x)
x
E(x) E(y)
(2) Model/Prediction as a service
Figure 1: An overview of the regression training process and prediction as a service over a mobile network in the federated
setting. For the training phase, each user holds a dataset Di , and the server holds an ML model θ . Users and the server jointly
compute the global gradientω. For the prediction service, the user holds a data point and the server holds a trained model.
σj =
√
1
d−1 (
∑d
i=1 x
(i)
j
2 − (2d − 1)µ2j ), j ∈ [n]. Secure computation
of basis statistics such as mean and standard deviation has been
widely investigated using secret sharing, (labeled) homomorphic
encryption, and aggregation protocols, e.g., [4, 5, 13, 37].
As we have considered a scenario of users dropping out, we
perform the scaling process using a dropout-enabled aggregation
protocol (πDeA), coordinated by the server. Instead of running πDeA
twice (once for computing µ and another for σ ), our idea is to run
πDeA only once on 2n dimensional inputs X (i), which we construct
from n-dimensional inputs x(i) as follows. Each user Pi locally
computes a single input X (i) on its dataset Di as
X (i) =
( ∑
x∈Di
x1, · · · ,
∑
x∈Di
xn ,
∑
x∈Di
x21 , · · · ,
∑
x∈Di
x2n
)
where x = (x1, · · · ,xn ). This can be viewed as processing multiple-
data using a single execution of the protocol. On inputs {X (i),di }
from users in U and a security parameter t , the server receives
(Ua ,X ) ← πDeA(U, {X (i),di }, |U|, t) with |U| ≥ t where X =
(X1, · · · ,Xn ,Xn+1, · · · ,X2n ) = ∑u ∈Ua X (u) if |Ua | ≥ t , and Ua
are the alive users who participated in the scaling process. If |Ua | <
t , abort the protocol. The server computes themean µ = (µ1, · · · , µn )
and standard deviation σ = (σ1, · · · ,σn ) as µ j = X jda , and σj =√
1
da−1 (Xn+j − (2da − 1)µ2j ), j ∈ [n] and da =
∑
u ∈Ua du . The
server then sends µ and σ to all users inUa through an authenti-
cated channel. Using µ and σ , the users scale their local datasets.
4.2 A High-level Overview of Our Regression
Training Protocols
Basis idea. To train a regression model, the users and the server
execute a multiparty global gradient computation protocol where
the server gives the model and the users provide their local datasets
as inputs, and the server obtains an updated model as an output.
The novelty of PrivFL’s multiparty gradient computation is that
the global gradient computation is performed by executing multi-
ple two-party shared local gradient protocols in parallel, followed
by executing a global gradient share-reconstruction protocol re-
alized using an aggregation protocol (see Figure 2). As shown in
Section 3, sending the local gradient directly to the server may leak
users’ datasets Di . Our idea is to prevent such leakage by addi-
tively secret-sharing the local gradientωi of a user Pi between the
server and the user such that si − ri = ωi , where the server holds
the share si , and the user Pi holds the share ri . To prevent leak-
ing the model to the users, the server encrypts the model θ using
an additive homomorphic encryption scheme. In the first phase,
each user computes an encrypted share E(si ) ofωi from E(θ ) and
Di . This is computed by a protocol called, the shared local gradi-
ent (SLG) computation protocol. Instead of sending the individual
users’ shares to the server, the users send their shares in aggre-
gate. For this, the server conducts a share reconstruction process
to obtain an aggregate-sum of the shares. This phase is called the
share reconstruction phase. After computingω on alive users’ (Ua )
datasets from {si } and {ri } as ω = ∑u ∈Ua su − ∑u ∈Ua ru , the
server updates the model as θ ← θ − ηdaω where da =
∑
u ∈Ua du .
Figure 2 depicts an overview of secure multiparty global gradient
computation on the joint dataset D.
SLG
SLG
SLG
ωm = sm − rm
ω2 = s2 − r2
ω1 = s1 − r1
...
Dm
E(θ )
D2
E(θ )
D1
E(θ )
rm
E(sm )
r2
E(s2)
r1
E(s1)
Share recon-
struction
phase
Decryption
+ aggrega-
tion
Ua
...
...
ω =
∑
i ωi
θ ← θ − ηda ω
θω =
s − r
s =
∑
i si
r =
∑
i ri
Computing local gradient shares
Computing global gradient
from local shares
Figure 2: PrivFL’s protocol flow of privacy-preserving global
gradient computation for regression models.
Advantage. The advantages of the above flow of the protocol are
as follows. At the i-th round of the training process, the users
participating in the global gradient computation process do not
need to know the other participating users ahead of the time. The
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information about the other participating users will be enough to
know only in the share reconstruction phase. This provides a great
flexibility in the global gradient computation phase for handling the
dropout scenario in mobile applications. Moreover, the server can
choose the participating users randomly based on their aliveness
in the global gradient computation phase. Note that the server can
choose the participating users and let all users know ahead of time,
but this will be computationally expensive for both users and the
server for handling the dropout scenario. Notice that any two-party
protocol can be used to realize the SLG computation. However, we
use an additive-HE based technique for regression models to make
it communication efficient because of our application scenario.
4.3 Secure Shared Local Gradient Computation
Protocols
A secure shared local gradient computation involves a user and the
server. We present two protocols for computing the shared local
gradient computation: one protocol is for the linear regression (see
Figure 3), and another is for the logistic regression (see Figure 4).
Computing the SLG for linear regression. To minimize the
number of rounds, the server encrypts the model using an additive
HE scheme and sends it to the user Pi so that it can compute two
shares of the local gradient ωi on its dataset Di in one round of
communication. Note that only the server holds the private key of
the HE scheme. An inner product computation of two vectors is a
common task in training and evaluating a linear or logistic regres-
sion model. Secure inner product computation has been studied
in many settings, e.g., [27, 60]. For the sake of completeness, we
provide a homomorphic inner product computation protocol from
[27] in Algorithm 1. Figure 3 presents the shared local gradient
computation protocol for a linear/ridge regression model.
Algorithm 1 Encrypted Inner Product
1: Input: x and E(θ )
2: Output: E(θ · x)
3: procedure IP_User
4: E(θ · x) =∏nj=1 E(θ j )x j · E(θ0)
5: return E(θ · x)
6: end procedure
Secure SLG Protocol: Linear regression (πLinSLG )
Server: Regression model θ , User (Pi ): Di
Output: Server receives E(si ), Pi receives ri .
1. Server encrypts the model θ and sends E(θ ) to the user Pi
2. User Pi runs Algorithm 2 on inputs E(θ ) and Di , and obtains
(E(si ), ri ) such that si − ri = ωi = GD(θ, Di , di ).
3. Pi stores ri and sends E(si ) to the server.
Figure 3: Secure shared local gradient computation protocol
for a linear regression model.
Computing the SLG for logistic regression. The computation
of the local gradient involves an evaluation of the sigmoid function
Algorithm 2 Computing Shares of Local Gradient for Linear Re-
gression
1: Input: D = {(x(i ), y (i ))}pi=1 and E(θ )
2: Output: (E(s), r) s.t. s − r = ∑pj=1 err(j )
3: procedure Comp_LinSLG_Share
4: Randomly generate r = (r0, r1, · · · , rn )
5: Set t← (0, 0, · · · , 0)
6: for i = 1 to p do
7: E(e (i )) = IP_User(x(i ), E(θ )) · E(−y (i ))
8: E(t0) ← E(t0) · E(e (i )) = E(t0 + e (i ))
9: for j = 1 to n do
10: E(tj ) ← E(tj ) · E(e (i ))x
(i )
j = E(tj + e (i )x (i )j )
11: end for
12: end for
13: Compute E(s) = E(t) · E(r) = E(t + r)
14: return (E(s), r)
15: end procedure
on θ · x(j). As shown for linear regression, the server and the user
can compute E(θ · x(j)) in one round of communication. As we
used an additive HE scheme, the user and the server need one
more round of communication to compute E(σ3(θ ·x(j))),x(j) ∈ Di
from E(θ · x(j)) where the sigmoid function is approximated by
a cubic polynomial, which provides a good tradeoff between the
accuracy and the efficiency. Let σ3(x) = q0 + q1x + q2x2 + q3x3 be
a cubic approximation of σ (x) where the coefficients qi are public.
To protect an input x against the server, the user masks y = θ · x
as z = y + r by choosing a random value r , and then sends it to the
server. The computation of σ3(y) can be expressed as
σ3(y) = σ3(z) − σ3(r ) − (q0 + 3q3r3) − 3q3rz2 − (2q2r − 6q3r2)y.
To reduce computational cost for the users, the server computes
E(z2) and E(σ3(z)) from E(z) and sends (E(z2),E(σ3(z))) to the user.
Given E(y),E(z2),E(σ3(z)) and r , the user can compute E(σ3(y))
using the homomorphic property of the encryption scheme as
E(z2)−3q3rE(y)−(2q2r−6q3r 2)E(−(σ3(r ) + (q0 + 3q3r3)))E(σ3(z)).
Once the user has {E(σ3(θ · x(j)))}, it can compute the local gradi-
ent ωi on Di , using the steps described in Algorithm 3. Figure 4
summarizes the shared local gradient computation protocol for a
logistic regression model.
Algorithm 3 Computing Shares of Local Gradient for Logistic
Regression
1: Input: D = {(x(i ), yi )}pi=1 and {E(σ3(θ · x(i )))}
2: Output: (E(s), r) s.t. s − r = ∑pj=1 err(j )
3: procedure Comp_LogSLG_Share
4: Randomly generate r = (r0, r1, · · · , rn )
5: Set t← (0, 0, · · · , 0)
6: for i = 1 to p do
7: E(e (i )) = E(σ3(θ · x(i ))) · E(−y (i ))
8: E(t0) ← E(t0) · E(e (i )) = E(t0 + e (i ))
9: for j = 1 to n do
10: E(tj ) ← E(tj ) · E(e (i ))x
(i )
j = E(tj + e (i )x (i )j )
11: end for
12: end for
13: Compute E(s) = E(t) · E(r) = E(t + r)
14: return (E(s), r)
15: end procedure
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Secure SLG Protocol: Logistic regression (πLogSLG )
Server: Regression model θ , User (Pi ): Di
Output: Server receives E(si ), Pi receives ri .
1. Server encrypts the model θ and sends E(θ ) to the user Pi
2. Pi randomly generates {c j }dij=1.
3. Pi computes: for j = 1 to di do
Compute E(zj ) ← IP_User(x(j ), E(θ )) · E(c j ), where zj = θ ·
x(j ) + c j
endfor
4. Pi sends {E(zj )} to the server
5. Server decrypts {E(zj )}dij=1 } and computes
{E(z2j ), E(hq (zj ))}dij=1 and sends to Pi
6. Pi computes: for j = 1 to di do
t = E(−(hq (c j ) + (q0 + 3q3c3j ))) · E(θ · x(j ))
−(2q2cj−6q3c2j )
E(σ3(θ · x(j ))) = E(σ3(zj ))E(z2j )−3q3cj · t
endfor
7. Pi runs Algorithm 3 on inputs {E(σ3(θ · x(j )))} and Di , and
obtains (E(si ), ri ) such that si − ri = ωi = GD(θ, Di , di ).
8. Pi stores ri and sends E(si ) to the server.
Figure 4: Secure shared local gradient computation protocol
for a logistic regression model.
Complexity.Wemeasure the computational complexity ofπLinSLG
and πLogSLG for computing the local gradient in terms of the num-
ber of ciphertext multiplications, the number of encryptions, and
the number of homomorphic constant multiplications. Table 1 sum-
marizes their exact numbers. Asymptotically, the overall computa-
tional complexity for both πLinSLG and πLogSLG is O(ndi ).
Let λ be the bit length of a ciphertext. Then, the communication
cost involved in computing ωi for the linear regression is 2(n +
1)λ, which is for receiving the encrypted model and sending an
encrypted share ofωi to the server. For the logistic regression, the
communication cost is (2(n + 1) + 3di )λ where di = |Di | is the
size of the dataset, which is due to receiving the encrypted model,
sending an encrypted share of ωi and information exchange for
homomorphically computing the approximated sigmoid function.
Table 1: Number of unit operations for each user in the gra-
dient computation protocols
Protocol #CT MUL #Const MUL #Enc
Linear regression (πLinSLG) 2(n + 1)di − (n + 1) 2ndi di + (n + 1)
Logistic regression (πLogSLG) (2n + 5)di − (n + 1) 2(n + 2)di 3di + (n + 1)
Security. We prove the security of two SLG computation proto-
cols in the simulation paradigm. Theorems 1 and 2 summarize the
security of the SLG computation protocols for linear and logistic
regressions. We show that an adversary A controlling a user Pi
(resp. the server) does not learn anything about θ (resp.ωi ) during
the execution of πLinSLG and similarly for πLogSLG. Due to the space
limit, we present the security proofs in Appendix B.1.
Theorem 1. Assume that the additive homomorphic encryption
scheme E() is semantically secure. The protocol πLinSLG between Pi
and S securely computes two shares of the local gradient on the dataset
Di in the presence of semi-honest adversaries.
Theorem 2. Assume that the additive homomorphic encryption
scheme E() is semantically secure. The protocol πLogSLG between Pi
and S securely computes two shares of the local gradient ωi on the
dataset Di in the presence of semi-honest adversaries.
4.4 Privacy-preserving Regression Model
Training Protocol
The training protocol is executed between the server, and a set ofm
users in a synchronous network and is divided into three phases: 1)
a pairwise key establishment phase, 2) a dataset scaling phase and
3) computing the regression model by iteratively computing the
global gradient over a subset of users’ data. A pair of pairwise keys
is established using a Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement protocol
to realize an authenticated channel between a pair of users and to
use in the aggregation protocol. Before starting the training process,
the users need to learn the mean and standard deviation on the
entire dataset D, which can be easily computed by running the
aggregation protocol as shown in Section 4.1.
The process of the global gradient computation 1 consists of four
main steps:
• the server randomly chooses a set ofM users and broadcasts
the current encrypted model to these users,
• the server and each user privately compute two shares of
the local gradient on the chosen user’s dataset in parallel,
• the server and alive users compute a single (aggregated)
share from the alive users’ shares of the local gradients,
• the server computes the second share of the global gradient
from its local shares and then recovers the global gradient
for updating the model.
The parameterM is chosen based on the security parameter of the
aggregation protocol and the ϵ-privacy of the aggregate-sum (see
Appendix A.5). For simplicity, we assume that each user has an
equal number of data points, i.e., |Di | = di = ℓ,∀i . For a coalition
of c users and/or the server in the ϵ-private aggregation scheme,
the number of dropouts, denoted by δ , must satisfy the following
constraint: ℓ(M − δ − c) ≥ ϵ , which implies δ ≤ (M − ρ − c)
where ρ = ⌈ ϵℓ ⌉. To resist a coalition of up to t parties including
users and the server, M must be at least 2t where t = ⌈m3 ⌉. For a
coalition of size up to t and M = 2t , δ ≤ (t − ρ). When ℓ = 1, for
such a coalition of size up to t and δ = t dropouts, the number of
users must participate in the training process is at least 2t + ϵ . The
threshold value of πDeA in the scaling phase must be at least 2t .
Figure 5 summarizes the complete protocol for training a linear or
logistic regression model, given the parameters δ , t , ϵ and ℓ, while
handling the dropout scenario.
Efficiency. It is easy to verify that the training protocol is correct
if the users provide their true inputs and the server does not al-
ter the model. Since the aggregation protocol is executed (R + 1)
times, the users establish the pairwise keys using a Diffie-Hellman
protocol, coordinated by the server, as shown in [7], and then in
each execution of πDeA the users derive a pair of one-time pairwise
1In the training phase, the batch size in the gradient computation varies in the range
of (t + ρ − 1)ℓ and 2t ℓ, and |Di | = ℓ.
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Privacy-preserving Regression Training Protocol (πLinTrain or πLogTrain)
//Pairwise key establishment phase
1. Mobile users and the server establish pairwise key among themselves using a DH key agreement protocol. Let U0 ⊂ U be set of users that
established pairwise keys and agreed to participate in the training phase. If |U0 | < M , abort the protocol.
//Data scaling phase
2. Each user in U0 locally computes the mean of its dataset Di Xi =
( ∑|Di |
j=1 x
(j )
1 , · · · ,
∑|Di |
j=1 x
(j )
n ,
∑|Di |
j=1 x
(j )
1
2
, · · · , ∑|Di |j=1 x (j )n 2) .
3. Server and the users in U0 execute the aggregation protocol πDeA with inputs {Xu }u∈U0 and obtains (U1, Xsum ) ←
πDeA
(U0, {Xu }u∈U0, |U0 |, 2t ) where Xsum = ∑u∈U1 Xu = (X1, · · · , Xn, Xn+1, · · · , X2n ). If |U1 | ≥ 2t , the server computes the mean
µ over D = ∪u∈U1Du as µ = (µ1, · · · , µn ) with µ j = 1d1 X j and d1 = |U1 | · ℓ, and the standard deviation σ vector as σ = (σ1, · · · σn )
with σj =
√
1
d1
Xn+j − (2d1 − 1)µ2j , 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Server sends µ and σ to all users in U1.
4. After receiving µ and σ , each user Pi in U1 scales its dataset as x← x−µσ , x ∈ Di .
// Iterative training process
5. Server randomly initializes the model θ
6. for j = 1...R do
- Let V ⊆ U1 be the set of alive users at the current time. If |V | < M , abort the protocol.
- Server chooses Vj ← (randomly choosing M users from V) at time Tj . // Gradient computation at time interval [Tj , Tj + ∆]
- Server encrypts the regression model θ and then broadcasts the encrypted model E(θ ) to the users in Vj .
- for each user Pi ∈ Vj in parallel do
Server runs the SLG computation protocol π with Pi . Server receives E(si ) and Pi receives ri as output where (E(si ), ri ) ← π (θ, Di ) and
π ∈ {πLinSLG, πLogSLG }.
endfor
- Let V′j ⊆ Vj be the set of users who successfully completed the SLG computation protocol and sent E(si ) to the server. If |V′j | < (t + ρ),
abort the protocol.
- Server and users in V′j run the aggregation protocol πDeA and complete the protocol execution in time (Tj+∆). Server receives (V′′j , rsum ) ←
πDeA
(V′j , {ru }u∈V′j , |V′j |, t ) . If |V′′j | < (t + ρ), abort the protocol.
- Server decrypts E(su ) for each u ∈ V′′j , and then computes ssum =
∑
u∈V′′j su .
- Server computes ω as ω = ssum − rsum and updates the model as θ ← θ − ηda ·ω with da =
∑
v∈V′′j dv = |V
′′
j | · ℓ.
endfor
7. Server stores the regression model θ .
Figure 5: Privacy-preserving training protocol for a linear or logistic regression model over a mobile network.
keys from the master pairwise keys using a hash-chain, as shown
in [44]. Thus, the key establishment phase is executed only once.
The computational complexity of the aggregation protocol πDeA
withm users and n dimensional inputs for a user is O(m2 +mn),
and for the server is O(m2n). The computational complexity for
one execution of the global gradient computation phase involves
the computational complexities of πLinSLG or πLogSLG and πDeA,
which is O(4t2 + 2tn + ndi ) = O(m2 +mn + ndi ) when t = ⌈m3 ⌉. If
the training phase takes R iterations to obtain a model, the overall
computational complexity of a user is O(R(m2 +mn + ndi )). The
computational complexity of the server for the training phase is
O(R(m2n +mndi )) which includes the computational complexities
of the scaling phase and R executions of the privacy-preserving
gradient computation phase.
The communication complexity of each user includes the costs
of the DH key exchange protocol coordinated by the server, the
scaling phase and the R iterations of πLinSLG or πLogSLG and πDeA.
When we choose t = ⌈m3 ⌉, the communication complexity of πDeA,
πLinSLG and πLogSLG isO(m+n),O(n) andO(2n+3di ), respectively.
Therefore, the overall communication complexity of each user is
O(R(m + n)) for linear regression and O(R(m + n + di )) for logistic
regression, respectively. The server’s communication complexity is
O(R(m2 +mn)) for linear regression, and O(m2 + Rm(n + di ))) for
logistic regression, including the pairwise communication costs of
protocols πLinSLG or πLogSLG and πDeA.
The storage overhead of the protocol is dominated by that of
the aggregation protocol πDeA. The storage overhead for each user
is O(m + n) for linear regression, and O(m + n + di ) for logistic
regression, which is for storing secret-shares sent by the other users
in πDeA, the encrypted model and intermediate results for logistic
regression. As the server needs to store the model, shares of the
local gradients, the secret-shares of πDeA, and intermediate results
of πLogSLG, the storage complexity of the server is O(m2 +mn) for
linear regression, and O(m2 +mn +mdi ) for logistic regression.
Security.We consider the security of the training protocols against
semi-honest adversarieswhere three different threatmodels, namely
users-only threat model, server-only threat model and users-server
threat model are considered. The security of the training protocols
are proved in the simulation paradigm using the hybrid arguments.
In Theorem 3, we present that a semi-honest adversary corrupting
at most t parties including the server and a set of at most (t − 1)
users can learn no information about the honest users’ datasets.
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The security of the regression training protocols is achieved by that
of the SLG protocols, the aggregation protocol and the aggregation
privacy game defined in Appendix A.5. Due to the space limit, a
formal security proof is provided in Appendix B.2.
Theorem 3 (Privacy in Users-Server Threat Model). The
protocols πLinTrain and πLogTrain are secure in the presence of semi-
honest adversaries, meaning they leak no information about the honest
users’ inputsDi with |Di | ≥ 1 to the adversary corrupting the server
and a set of users of size up to (t − 1).
In Theorem 4, we show that a semi-honest adversary corrupting
at most (t − 1) users in the training phase learns no information
about the honest server’s model. Intuitively, since the model is
encrypted using a semantically secure additive HE scheme, the
model privacy is protected against semi-honest users.
Theorem 4 (Privacy in Users-only Threat Model). The pro-
tocols πLinTrain and πLogTrain are secure in the presence of semi-
honest adversaries, meaning they leak no information about the honest
server’s model θ to the adversary corrupting a set of users of size up
to (t − 1).
4.5 Oblivious Regression Prediction Protocols
We consider a scenario where, after training the model, users wish
to use the trained regressionmodel as predictions as a service, which
is quite natural because the model was trained on their datasets,
or the server wishes to offer regression predictions as a service to
other clients. An oblivious regression prediction protocol is run
between the server and a user. In this computation, the server holds
a secret regression model θ , and a user has a private input x. An
oblivious regression prediction protocol allows the user only to
learn h(θ ,x) without revealing x to the server and θ to the users.
We assume that each user has a public and private key pair,
denoted by (pkPi , skPi ), of an additive homomorphic encryption
scheme and its public key is known to the server. For oblivious
predictions, the user sends an encrypted input to the server. For
linear regression, the server computes EpkPi (θ · x) from EpkPi (x)
and θ . For logistic regression, our oblivious prediction protocol uses
the same idea on a single input as used in the SLG computation
protocol. Figures 6 and 7 present the oblivious regression prediction
protocols for linear and logistic regressions, respectively.
Efficiency. For the linear regression prediction, a user needs to
perform n encryptions to encrypt the input x of dimension n and
one decryption to decrypt the result. The server needs to perform n
ciphertext multiplications,n homomorphic constant multiplications
and one encryption. On the other hand, for the logistic regression
prediction, the user need to perform (n + 2) encryptions, and two
decryptions. The server needs to perform (n + 3) ciphertext multi-
plications, (n + 2) constant multiplications and three encryptions.
The communication cost of a user for the oblivious prediction is
measured in terms of the amounts of bits the user needs to exchange.
The amount of bits a user needs to exchange for linear regression
is (n + 1)λ, and for the logistic regression is (n + 4)λ.
Security. It is shown that the attacks on the model can be per-
formed when used as prediction services e.g., in [23, 56] due to
querying the model multiple times to access the prediction APIs.
We assume that no information is leaked about the model through
Oblivious Predicion: Linear Regression (πLinOP)
Server: Private model θ , User (Pi ): Private input x
Output: Pi receives h(θ, x).
1. User Pi encrypts its input x and sends EpkPi (x) to the server
2. Server computes EpkPi (h(θ, x)) ←
∏n
j=1 EpkPi (x j )
θj ·
EpkPi (θ0) where h(θ, x) = x · θ . It sends EpkPi (h(θ, x)) to Pi .
3. Pi decrypts EpkPi (x · θ ) and obtains h(θ, x).
Figure 6: Oblivious linear regression prediction protocol.
Oblivious Prediction: Logistic Regression (πLogOP)
Server: Private model θ , User (Pi ): Private input x
Output: Pi receives σ3(θ · x).
1. User Pi encrypts x and sends E(x) to the server
2. Server randomly generates r , and computes E(z) ←∏n
j=1 EpkPi (x j )
θj · EpkPi (θ0) · EpkPi (r ), where z = θ · x + r
and sends {EpkPi (z)} to the user
3. Pi decrypts EpkPi (z) and computes EpkPi (z
2), EpkPi (σ3(z))
and sends to the server
4. Server computes the following:
t = EpkPi (−(hq (r )+(q0+3q3r
3))) ·EpkPi (θ ·x)
−(2q2r−6q3r 2)
EpkPi (σ3(θ · x)) = EpkPi (σ3(z))EpkPi (z
2)−3q3r · t
5. Pi decrypts EpkPi (σ3(θ · x)) and obtains σ3(θ · x).
Figure 7: Oblivious logistic regression prediction protocol.
the prediction APIs under a bounded number of queries. As coun-
termeasures proposed in [23, 56] to prevent leakage, which is out
of the scope of this work. Theorem 5 summarizes the security of
regression prediction protocols.
Theorem 5. The protocols πLinOP and πLogOP are secure in the
presence of semi-honest adversaries, meaning they leak no information
about the model θ to a semi-honest user, and no information x to a
semi-honest server, except what can be learnt obviously.
Proof. It is easy to see that both protocols output the correct re-
sult if the parties are honest. We will first consider the privacy of the
user input. In both protocols, the server observes an n-dimensional
ciphertext vector, which is an encryption of x under a semantically
secure HE scheme, and hence it learns nothing about the input.
Thus, the input privacy of the user is protected.
We now consider the privacy of the model against a semi-honest
user. For πLinOP, the user observes the output h(θ ,x) after encryp-
tion, thus it learns no information about the model after one query.
In πLogOP, the user observes z after decrypting E(z) and learns noth-
ing about z as z = θ · x + r is random where r is chosen uniformly
at random by the server. Thus the user learns only σ3(θ · x). □
5 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of PrivFL under semi-
honest adversaries, providing 128-bit security. We first provide
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implementation details and then show how to deal with floating-
point numbers when conjunct the regression algorithms with cryp-
tographic primitives. Finally, we present experimental results of
PrivFL on real-world datasets from the UCI ML repository.
5.1 Implementation and Dataset Details
Implementation details.We have implemented PrivFL in C us-
ing GMP [29] for large number operation, the FLINT library [32]
for efficient secret sharing implementations and OpenSSL [50] for
implementing an authenticated channel. We choose the Joye-Libert
(JL) cryptosystem [33] to instantiate the additive homomorphic
encryption scheme, over Paillier [51], and Bresson et al. [10] cryp-
tosystems as its ciphertext size is 2× smaller. If the server is a cloud
provider (e.g., Google, Microsoft, Apple), with the computation abil-
ity of the server, we can save the communication cost by a factor of
two, which is quite reasonable for mobile applications. We imple-
ment the Joye-Libert cryptosystem using GMP. We implement an
aggregation protocol that is a compilation of Bonawitz et al.’s [7]
and Mandal et al.’s [44] protocols that handle user dropouts. The
following crypto-primitives are used to implement the aggregation
protocol under semi-honest adversaries.
– We use the NIST P-256 curve from OpenSSL for the Elliptic-
curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) pairwise key establishment.
– We use AES in counter mode implemented using AES-NI
instructions to implement PRG.
– We use AES-GCM from OpenSSL to implement a secure
channel.
– We use SHA256 to derive one-time pairwise keys.
– We implement Shamir’s threshold secret sharing (tss) schemes,
namely (2, 3)-tss and (t ,m)-tss operations using the FLINT
polynomial operation library, with NIST’s 256-bit prime q.
We have chosen the message space Z2k with k = 256 where q < 2k ,
which is enough for handling high-dimension data used in our
experiment. Our experiments were conducted on a desktop with a
3.40GHz Intel i7 and 12 GB RAM. The codes were compiled using
gcc 5.4.0 with -std=c99 -O1 -fomit-frame-pointer flag.
Datasets.We evaluate the performance of PrivFL on 11 different
real-world datasets from the UCI ML repository [19]. We use 6
different datasets with various sizes and dimensions, summarized
in Table 2, for evaluating the linear/ridge regression training pro-
tocols, and 5 different datasets, summarized in Table 3, for logistic
regression training protocols. The dimension of the dataset ranges
from 8 to 22 for linear regression and from 9 to 32 for logistic
regression. For linear regression, we use the root mean squared
error (RMSE) to measure the predictive accuracy of the model. For
logistic regression, we measure the accuracy of the model using
the standard method by computing a confusion matrix. Note that
no privacy-preserving mechanism is used to compute the accuracy
of the model.
5.2 Dealing with Floating Point Numbers
In regression algorithms, the datasets and the model parameters
are floating point numbers, both positive and negative, but the
cryptographic techniques namely additive HE and secret sharing
work over the finite ring of integers. We provide the details about
encoding floating point numbers to elements of Z2k and vice-versa
via decoding.
Table 2: Dataset used in our experiment for linear/ridge re-
gression models.
Id Name n d Reference
1 Auto MPG 8 392 [3]
2 Boston Housing Dataset 14 506 [9]
3 Energy Efficiency 9 768 [59]
4 Wine Quality 12 1,599 [14]
5 Parkinsons Telemonitoring 22 5,875 [58]
6 Bike Sharing Dataset 12 17,379 [21]
Table 3: Dataset used in our experiment for logistic regres-
sion model. † 20 out of 90 features were chosen.
Id Name n d Reference
7 Breast Cancer Dataset 32 454 [19]
8 Credit Approval Dataset 14 652 [18]
9 Diabetes Dataset 9 768 [15]
10 Credit Card Clients 24 30,000 [62]
11 US Census Income Dataset 20† 48,842 [12, 40]
Table 4: Number of the users and their training dataset
size. Accuracy of the trained regression models achieved by
PrivFL.
Linear regression Logistic regression
ID m di RMSE ID m di Score (%)
1 28 10 3.16 7 32 10 96.00
2 36 10 4.91 8 46 10 87.60
3 54 10 3.85 9 54 10 76.48
4 112 10 0.68 10 700 30 80.72
5 206 20 3.45 11 1140 30 89.60
6 609 20 147.80
Encoding and decoding. The encoding operation is applied on
floating point numbers before performing cryptographic operations.
As the message space is Z2k , we divide the message space into two
halves: the positive numbers are in [0, 2k−1 − 1], and the negative
numbers are in [2k−1, 2k − 1] ≡ [−2k−1,−1]. We convert each
floating point number to an element of Z2k while maintaining its
precision. Given an absolute floating point number x in x(i), the
corresponding ring element, denoted as x˜ in Z2k , is computed as
x˜ = FE(x ,τ ) = round(x · 2τ ), and each floating point number y
in {y(i)} is converted to a ring element as y˜ = FE(y, 2τ ). If x is
negative, the corresponding ring element is x˜ = 2k − FE(x ,τ ), and
similarly for y in {y(i)}.
Given x˜ ∈ Z2k , the decoding of x˜ is given by x = FD(x˜ ,τ ) =
− 2k−z2τ if x˜ ≥ 2k−1, otherwise z2τ .
Evaluating inner product. Given θ ∈ Rn+1 and x ∈ Rn and the
corresponding vectors in Z2k are θ˜ ∈ Zn+12k and x˜ ∈ Z
n
2k where θ˜0 =
FE(θ0, 2τ ), θ˜i = FE(θi ,τ ) and x˜i = FE(xi ,τ ). Then, θ˜ · x˜ = 22τθ · x.
Thus, θ ·x = FD(θ˜ · x˜). If y˜ = FE(−y, 2τ ), then θ ·x−y = FD(θ˜ · x˜+y˜).
Evaluating sigmoid.We approximate the sigmoid function σ (x)
over [−l , l] for some l to a cubic polynomial as σ3(x) = c0 + c1x +
c2x2 + c3x3. Note that the coefficients of the polynomial are public.
To evaluate σ3(z) over Z2k , we convert the coefficients of σ3(x) as
q0 = FE(c0, 7τ ), q1 = FE(c1, 5τ ), q2 = FE(c2, 3τ ), and q3 = FE(c3,τ ),
i.e., qi = FE
(
ci , (7 − 2 ∗ i)τ
)
and z ∈ R as z˜ = FE(x , 2τ ). Then
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σ3(z) = 27τ σ3(z), this implies σ3(z) = FD(σ3(z), 7τ ), where τ is
chosen so that there is no overflow in the message space Z2k .
5.3 Experimental Results
This section presents the performance of PrivFL where we report
the timings, communication costs, and storage overhead for training
and oblivious evaluation of linear and logistic regression algorithms
for each user and the server. As the model privacy and data privacy
while considering users dropping out in mobile applications have
not been considered in previous work, e.g., [7, 44], we do not com-
pare the performance of PrivFL with others in numerical values.
However, we provide a system goalwise comparison in Section 6.
Micro-benchmarking. The additive homomorphic encryption
and the aggregation protocol are two main operations that are fre-
quently performed in the protocol. We perform micro-benchmarks
that measure the timings of the basic operations, namely vector
encryption, decryption and constant multiplication operations for
the JL cryptosystem including floating point encoding and decoding
operations, and the aggregation protocol for a user and the server to
understand the deeper insight about the performance of the overall
protocol. Table 5 presents the timings for HE operations and the
aggregation protocol.
Table 5: Time in milliseconds (ms) (using a single CPU) for
vector encryption, decryption and const. multiplication of
the JL cryptosystem and the aggregation protocol.
Vector dimension (n)
Operations 10 20 30 40 50
Encryption (E(x)) 8.39 16.05 24.05 32.35 39.83
Decryption (D(x)) 4,027.02 8,131.76 12,134.78 16,178.63 20,107.34
Const. multiplication (E(x)z) 60.56 128.78 181.83 248.58 301.96
Aggregation protocol (πDeA) Number of users (m)
Dropout = 25%, n = 30 50 100 150 200 250
User time 20.38 41.45 63.43 85.86 107.10
Server time 34.79 161.36 420.90 823.35 1437.02
Timing for training regression models. For each dataset, we
shuffle the dataset and use approximately 70% for training and 30%
for testing to calculate the accuracy of the model. The training
dataset is then distributed into a set ofm users and each user holds
an equal number of data points, given in Table 4. We randomly
choose 2t users out of them users for their participations in com-
puting the global gradient in the training phase where t = ⌈m3 ⌉
andm is the total number of users. In our experiment, we set the
number of dropout users in the gradient computation to δ = ⌈ t2 ⌉,
and choose the aggregation size large enough to protect users’
inputs privacy. For each dataset, the experiments were repeated
five times, except the datasets Credit Card Clients and US Census
Income datasets.
We compare the accuracy of the trained model obtained using
the privacy-preserving training protocol with the trained model
obtained using the sklearn tool (in clear, no security) for each
dataset. Our achieved accuracy is very closed to the no security one
( which is close to the state-of-the-art accuracy). The number of
iteration needed to achieve such accuracy is R = 350 iterations for
linear/ridge regression andR = 300 iterations for logistic regression,
respectively. Figures 8a and 8c present the timings for training the
linear and logistic regressionmodels per user. Figure 8b and 8b show
the server’s timings for training the linear and logistic regression
models. All experiment results were obtained using a single CPU.
In our experiment, no communication time is considered.
For instance, to train the parkinsons telemonitoring data for a
linear regression model, a user elapses about 105 milliseconds (ms)
to compute the global gradient, and in the worst case, it elapses
about 170 seconds (sec) for the entire training process. The “worst
case" is because of the fact that a user may be chosen a maximum of
R times. On the other hand, the server’s computation time is about
10 sec for each global gradient computation, and in total about 56.57
mins. To train the credit card clients data using a logistic regression
model, a user elapses about 1066 ms to compute the global gradient,
and in the worst case, a user elapses about 320 sec for the entire
training process. The server’s computation time is about 99 mins
for each global gradient computation, and in total about 495.3 hours,
which is because of performing a total of 4, 219, 200 JL decryptions
and 300 executions of πDeA with 2t users and t/2 dropouts where
t = 234. By exploiting parallelism using 24 CPUs, the training time
for the server can be reduced to approximately 20 hours (estimated
using the timings of unit operations).
For instance, according to our experimental settings, to train a
linear model on the bike sharing dataset, PrivFL’s computational
overheads for the server and each user, compared to a normal sys-
tem, are 2.7 × 105 and 1.2 × 106, resp., where the normal system
(naive implementation) provides no model and data privacy. Sim-
ilarly, for training a logistic regression model on the credit card
clients dataset, PrivFL’s computational overheads for the server
and each user are 1.4 × 108 and 3.2 × 105, resp.. The server’s high
computational overhead is due to the JL decryption algorithm.
Note that the communication latencies among users or the server
interactions during the protocol execution are not included in our
experiment. However, the total execution time of the training proto-
col will be the computation times plus the communication latencies.
Timing for oblivious regression predictions.We also measure
the performance of the oblivious evaluations of linear and regres-
sion models on the aforementioned datasets. The performance of
the oblivious predictions depends on the dimension of the dataset.
Table 6 summarizes the timings of a user and the server for oblivi-
ously evaluating linear and logistic regression models. The experi-
ments are repeated ten times for each point. From Table 6, we can
observe that the time for the user is larger than that of the server,
which is due to the cost of the JL decryption operation.
Table 6: Time in milliseconds for oblivious regression pre-
diction for the server and the user.
Linear regression Logistic regression
ID User Server ID User Server
1 430.15 4.12 7 935.04 11.07
2 437.35 6.06 8 891.69 10.51
3 436.55 3.04 9 883.78 6.52
4 443.94 4.32 10 893.12 15.85
5 446.65 8.21 11 950.56 36.95
6 422.17 3.22
Communication and storage cost. For training a linear regres-
sion model, the communication cost in the training phase involves
receiving the encrypted model, transmitting the encrypted share
of the local gradient and information exchange in the share recon-
struction phase. For training a logistic regression model, in addition
to the linear regression’s communication cost, one more round
11
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Figure 8: Time in seconds for a user and in minutes for the server to train linear and logistic regression models.
of information exchange is required in the shared local gradient
computation phase. Figure 9a presents the maximum amount of
bits a user needs to transfer to accomplish the training phase for the
choice of the parameters and the achieved accuracy in Table 4. Note
that the communication cost for a user depends on howmany times
the user is chosen in the training phase. For instance, for training
the parkinsons telemonitoring data, in the worst case, a user need to
exchange 12.05 Megabyte (MB) of data to train the linear regression
model. On the other hand, for the credit card clients data, in the
worst case, a user need to exchange 36.10 Megabyte (MB) of data
to train the logistic regression model. The communication cost for
the server for each dataset is provided in Figure 9b. The storage
overheads for each user and the server is presented in Figures 9c
and 9d, respectively.
Optimizations. It can be observed from the protocol that there are
many scopes of paralleling the server’s computation (e.g., JL vector
decryption, encrypted vector multiplication, secret reconstruction
and PRG evaluation, etc). Exploiting such parallelism using mul-
tiple CPUs, the server’s computational time will be reduced to
several magnitudes. While generating the random vector r, users
can generate it using a PRG.
Discussions. In PrivFL, one can take a garbled circuit or purely
secret-sharing based approach to implement the shared local gradi-
ent protocol. As the local gradient computation for linear regres-
sion can be expressed as a circuit of multiplicative depth two, a
secret-sharing based approach will require at least two rounds of
communications plus an additional cost of generating multiplica-
tion triplets in an offline phase. If the multiplication of two b-bit
floating point numbers needs approximately b1.58 gates (according
to the Karatsuba algorithm), the computation of the local gradient
between the server and a user has a transmission cost of at least
8×128×b1.58×n = 210×n×b1.58 plus the transmission cost of the
OT protocol using a garbled circuit approach for an n-dimensional
vector. For an accuracy of six decimal places, this cost is much
larger than 2n log2(N ) bits for transmitting the encrypted model
as well as the local gradient using the JL cryptosystem where N
is a modulus of size 3072 bits. Similarly, for the logistic regression,
the transmission cost is roughly 29 × (2n + 1)b1.58 using the gar-
bled circuit approach, which is larger than 3n log2(N ) for each data
point. As mobile applications may have low bandwidth and slow
connections, a garbled circuit or purely secret-sharing based ap-
proach will incur a higher communication overhead compared to
an additive HE-based approach.
6 RELATEDWORK
Privacy-preserving LinearRegression. Privacy-preserving com-
putation of linear regression has received considerable attention.
Early works [17, 34–36, 53] have considered learning linear regres-
sion model on either horizontally or vertically distributed datasets.
Hall et al. [30] proposed protocols for linear regression based on
homomorphic encryption techniques. Nikolaenko et al. [49] pro-
posed a system for privacy-preserving computation of the ridge
regression model by combining homomorphic encryption and Yao
garbled circuits. In a follow-up work, Gascón et al. [25] proposed
protocols for linear regression models based on hybrid-MPC tech-
niques and Yao garbled circuits and using the conjugate gradient
descent algorithm. Bogdanov et al. [5] developed tools for privacy-
preserving linear regression based on secret sharing. Other ap-
proach for privacy-preserving linear regression is based on fully
homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme [26], which may not be
suitable for mobile applications. The work of [28] can be applied to
linear regression for the settings of MLaaS.
Privacy-preserving Logistic Regression. Logistic regression is
an essential technique to classify data. Aono et al. [8] proposed
a system for both training and predicting data using logistic re-
gression relying on additive homomorphic encryption where they
considered the computation outsourcing scenario in which a server
computes the logistic regression model and sends an encrypted
model to the user. They also showed how to make the system
differential privacy enabled. Bonte and Vercauteren [2] explored
secure training for logistic regression using somewhat homomor-
phic encryption in the computation outsourcing scenario where the
training is done using Newton-Raphson method. Kim et al. [39] also
investigated the training phase of the logistic regression model, us-
ing somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme, based on gradient
descent algorithm and the Taylor series polynomial approximation.
Zhu et al. [63] presented a secure outsourcing protocol for training
and evaluating logistic regression classifier in cloud. Kim et al. in
[38] proposed a method to train a logistic regressionmodel based on
the approximate homomorphic encryption. There is no satisfactory
solution for training an ML model using SWHE or FHE when data
come from multiple sources. All these techniques cannot handle
the dropout scenario and are not suitable for mobile applications.
Privacy-preserving Federated Learning. Shokri and Shmatikov
[55] presented a scheme for privacy-preserving deep learning. Hardy
et al. [31] presented a three-party protocol for logistic regression
using additive homomorphic encryption where the protocol con-
sists of privacy-preserving entity resolution and federated logistic
12
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Figure 9: Total data exchange in Megabyte (MB) and storage required in Kilobyte (KB) per user and the server to train linear
and logistic regression models.
regression and the data is vertically partitioned. Their protocol can-
not handle the dropout scenario, and privacy is not ensured when
the dataset contains only one point. Note that their work have not
considered the model privacy. Our solution is more general com-
pared to theirs. Fioretto and Hentenryck in [22] proposed a protocol
for federated data sharing to use under the framework of differen-
tial privacy, which allows the users to release a privacy-preserving
version of the dataset. This dataset can be used to train various
predictors for linear regression, logistic regression, and support
vector machines. Liu et al. [43] proposed a technique for privacy-
preserving federated transfer learning. Truex et al. [57] presented
an approach for private federated learning, decision tree, neural
networks that provides data privacy guarantees using differential
privacy and threshold homomorphic encryption schemes.
Generic Secure ML Systems. Systems, namely SecureML [48],
Prio [13] and ABY3 [47] can be used to perform privacy-preserving
linear and logistic regression, but such systems need existence of
addition servers (other than the server used for coordination) where
users secret share their data among a set of servers. These systems
provide stronger security compared to ours because in PrivFL, the
server has access to the model in each iteration of the model update,
which is quite suitable in the federated setting. However, these
approaches are orthogonal to the federated learning setting where
users send (using secret sharing) their private data to the servers,
but in federated learning, users’ data never go out of the devices.
7 CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE
WORK
This paper presented PrivFL, a privacy-preserving system for train-
ing and oblivious predictions of the predictive models such as linear
and logistic regressions in the federated setting, while ensuring
dropout robustness and the data as well as the model privacy. PrivFL
enables a robust and secure training process by iteratively executing
a secure multiparty global gradient protocol built using lightweight
cryptographic primitives suitable for mobile applications. The se-
curity of PrivFL is analyzed against semi-honest adversaries. Our
experimental results on several real-world datasets demonstrate
the practicality of PrivFL to incorporate in the federated learning
system.
We intend to implement PrivFL on smartphones to evaluate its
efficiency. As today’s server platforms are equipped with multiple
CPUs, we are working on designing an easy-and-parallel imple-
mentation interface at the server-side to reduce the computation
time. While keeping the general protocol flow in Section 4.2 same,
we are extending our work to neural networks in a separate paper.
As a future work, it would be interesting to investigate the case of
users asynchronously participating in the training phase.
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A CRYPTOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide a background on the crypto-primitives
and schemes that are needed for the aggregation protocol. We also
present the aggregation privacy game of Buescher et al. [11].
A.1 PKI and DH Key Agreement
PrivFL requires an existence of a public key infrastructure (PKI)
due to the use of the secure aggregation protocol in which the
users need to establish two pairwise keys, and each user and the
server need to establish a pairwise key, which is done using the
Diffie-Hellman (DH) protocol [16]. For the users, one pairwise key
is used to derive one-time pairwise keys and the other one is used
to realize an authenticated channel with other users to exchange
information in the aggregation protocol. The users register their
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identities when they join first time and publish the identities and
public keys in the setup phase, as used in [7, 44].
A key agreement protocol consists of a tuple of three algorithms
(ParamGen,KeyGen,KeyAgree). We use an Elliptic curve variant
of the DH key agreement protocol. Given a security parameter
κ, the parameter generation algorithm (G,q,G) ← ParamGen(1κ )
samples a group of points on an elliptic curve over a field Fq of order
q and a generator G. The key generation algorithm (xA,xAG) ←
KeyGen(G,q, P) generates a secret key xA ←$ Zq and a public
key GA = xAG . The key agreement function KeyAgree computes a
pairwise key KAB = H (GAB ) where GAB ← KeyAgree(xA,GB ) =
xAxBG and H is a hash function. The security of the key agree-
ment protocol follows from the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH)
assumption.
A.2 Authenticated Encryption
An authenticated encryption scheme consists of three algorithms
(K, Enc,Dec) where K is a symmetric key generation algorithm,
Enc is a symmetric-key encryption algorithm that accepts a key and
a message as input and outputs a ciphertext and a tag, and Dec is a
decryption algorithm that takes a key, a ciphertext and a tag, and
outputs the original message or⊥. We use the AES-GCM that offers
the IND-CPA and INT-CTXT securities to realize an authenticated
channel.
A.3 Pseudorandom Generator and One-way
Function
A pseudorandom generator PRG : {0, 1}l → {0, 1}b , is a deter-
ministic function which accepts an l-bit binary string as input and
outputs an b-bit binary string with b >> l . The input to a PRG is
chosen uniformly at random. The security of a cryptographically
strong PRG is defined as its output bit stream is indistinguishable
from a truly random one. We used AES in counter mode as a PRG
in our experiment. A one-way function F : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}n is a
function that is easy to compute and hard to invert where n ≤ m.
Security of the one-way function F is the amount of work needed
to invert F on an input x . We use the SHA256 hash function to
realize a one-way function.
A.4 Threshold Secret Sharing
Let Fq be a finite field where q is a prime. A t-out-of-m threshold se-
cret sharing scheme ((t ,m)-tss) over Fq is a tuple of two algorithms
(Sharetm ,Rectm ) where the secret sharing algorithm Sharetm is a
randomized algorithm that takes a secret input s over Fq and out-
putsm shares of s , i.e., (s1, s2, . . . , sm ) ← Sharetm (s) and the recon-
struction algorithm Rectm accepts any t shares (si1 , si2 , · · · , sit ) as
input and outputs the original s . The correctness of the scheme is de-
fined as for any s , Pr(s1, · · · ,sm )←Sharetm (s)[Rec
t
m (si1 , si2 , · · · , sit ) =
s] = 1. The security of the scheme is defined as any set of less than
t users learns nothing about the secret s . We use Shamir’s threshold
secret sharing scheme [54] and a (2, 3)-tss in the secure aggregation
protocol.
A.5 Aggregation Privacy Game
Buescher et al. [11] formalized the privacy of an aggregation scheme
where the privacy of an aggregate is measured by the chances of an
adversary in winning the game in Figure 10. We use an aggregation
protocol that satisfies the aggregation privacy game.
Adversary Challenger
s0, s1 ←$Z2k b ←$Z2
s2, s2, · · · , sϵ ←$Z2k
s0, s1 s0, s1
s = sb +
ϵ∑
i=2
si
s
b′ ← A(s, s0, s1)
b′ return b =? b′
Figure 10: Privacy game for an aggregation scheme
Definition 1. We say an aggregate-sum is ϵ-private if the aggre-
gate s =
∑ϵ
i=1 si is secure under the privacy game defined in Figure 10,
meaning it leaks no information about any individual si .
B SECURITY ANALYSIS OF PRIVFL
This section presents the security proofs of the shared local gradient
computation protocols in Section 4.3, and the training protocols in
Section 4.4 for linear and logistic regression models.
B.1 Security of Shared Local Gradient
Computation Protocols
Before providing the proofs, we first define the ideal functionality
of the shared local gradient computation protocol in Figure 11. We
denote by FLinSLG and FLogSLG the ideal functionalities for the SLG
for linear and logistic regression models, respectively.
Inputs
Server (S ): Model θ
User (Pi ): Dataset Di
Outputs
User (Pi ): a random vector ri
Server (S ): si such that si = GD(θ, (Di , |Di |)) + ri .
Figure 11: Ideal functionality FSLG for an SLG computation.
Proofs of Theorems 1 and 2.We prove the security of two SLG
protocols in the simulation paradigm.
Proof of Theorem 1. To prove πLinSLG is secure, we show that
the adversary’s (A) view in the real-world execution of the pro-
tocol is indistinguishable from that of the ideal-world execution.
We assume that a trusted party computes the ideal functionality
FLinSLG in the ideal-world execution of the protocol. We construct
two different simulators, denoted by SS for the server S , and SPi
for the user Pi . We assume that the server receives the model θ and
the user Pi receives Di with size di from the environment, and the
simulator has access to FLinSLG.
Server S is semi-honest.When A controls the server, the simu-
lator SS works as follows:
• SS receives θ from the environment and sends it to FLinSLG
and receives s′ = ωi + r′ = (s ′0, s ′1, · · · , s ′n ).• SS runs S on input θ and receives E(θ ) = (E(θ0), · · · ,E(θn )).
• SS encrypts s using S’s public key and outputs whatever S
outputs.
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S ’s view in the real-world execution of the protocol is s = (s0, s1, . . . , sn )
after decrypting E(s) where
s = ωi + r =
( di∑
j=1
ej + r0, · · · ,
di∑
j=1
ejx
(j)
n + rn
)
where ei = h(θ ,x(j)). As r is chosen uniformly at random, any coor-
dinate of s, i.e., sl =
∑di
j=1 ejx
(j)
l + rl , 0 ≤ l ≤ n is indistinguishable
from random s ′l . Therefore, the server’s view in the real-execution
is indistinguishable from the view of the ideal-execution of the
protocol.
User Pi is semi-honest.When A controls the user Pi , the simu-
lator SPi works as follows.
• SPi receivesDi from the environment and sends it toFLinSLG
and receives r.
• SPi runs Pi on the input Di .
• SPi constructs E(0) and sends it to Pi and outputs whatever
Pi outputs.
Pi ’s view in the real-world execution of the protocol is E(θ ) =
(E(θ0), · · · ,E(θn )) where each E(θi ) is computationally indistin-
guishable from E(0), resulting in E(θ ) is indistinguishable from
E(0) due to the semantic security of E. Thus, the view of the adver-
sary in the real-world execution of the protocol is indistinguishable
from that of the ideal-world execution of the protocol. □
Proof of Theorem 2. We provide the constructions of two dif-
ferent simulators, denoted by SS for the server S and SPi for the
user Pi . We assume that the simulator has access to the ideal func-
tionality FLogSLG. We assume that the server receives the model θ
and the user Pi receives Di with size di from the environment.
Server S is semi-honest.When A controls the server, the simu-
lator SS works as follows:
• SS receives θ from the environment and sends it to FLinSLG
and receives s′ = ωi + r′ = (s ′0, s ′1, · · · , s ′n ).• SS runs S on input θ and receives E(θ ) = (E(θ0), · · · ,E(θn )).
• SS constructs
{
z′j
}di
j=1 where z
′
j = θ · xj + c ′j and sends{
E(z′j )
}
to S . Note that the simulator does not know actual
values of
{
c ′j
}
chosen by Pi .
• SS receives
{
zj
}
from S and computes
{
z2j
}
and
{
σ3(zj )
}
as
well as
{
E(z2j ),E(σ3(zj ))
}
and sends it to S
• SS encrypts s using S’s public key pk and sends to S and
outputs whatever S outputs.
S’s view in the real-world execution of the protocol is
{
zj
}di
j=1 and s =
(s0, s1, . . . , sn ) after decrypting E(s) where
zj = θ ·x(j)+c j , and s = ωi + r =
( di∑
j=1
ej +r0, · · · ,
di∑
j=1
ejx
(j)
n +rn
)
with ei = h(θ ,x(j)) and h is a logistic regression function. As
r is chosen uniformly at random, any coordinate of s, i.e., sl =∑di
j=1 ejx
(j)
l + rl , 0 ≤ l ≤ n is indistinguishable from s ′l . Therefore,
the server’s view in the real-world execution is indistinguishable
from that of the ideal-world execution of the protocol.
User Pi is semi-honest.When A controls the user Pi , the simu-
lator SPi works as follows.
• SPi receivesDi from the environment and sends it toFLogSLG
and receives r.
• SPi constructs E(θ ) = (E(0), · · · ,E(0)) and sends it to Pi .
• SPi runs Pi on the inputs Di and E(θ ) and obtains
{
E(zj )
}
where SPi generates random coins {c ′j } for Pi .
• SPi constructs
{(E(0),E(0))}dij=1 and sends to Pi and outputs
whatever Pi outputs.
Pi ’s view in the real-world execution of the protocol is given by
E(θ ), {(E(z2j ),E(σ3(zj ))}dij=1, which is computationally indistinguish-
able from that of the real-world execution of the protocol, due to
the semantic security of E. □
B.2 Security of Training Protocols
In this section, we prove the security of the training protocol against
semi-honest adversaries in the simulation paradigm by providing a
construction of a simulator. We use an aggregation protocol πDeA
that securely implements the ideal functionality in Figure 12. In
[7, 44], the security of the aggregation protocol is proved against
semi-honest and active adversaries. We only need the security of
πDeA against semi-honest adversaries. The security of the train-
ing protocol in the server-only threat model is a special case of
Theorem 3. So we omit it.
Inputs
Public param: a set of users U with |U | =m, a threshold
value t < m
Server (S ): Nothing (⊥)
User (Pi ): Private input si , i ∈ U
Outputs
User (Pi ): Nothing (⊥)
Server (S ): s =
∑
u∈V su, V ⊆ U if |V | ≥ t and ⊥ other-
wise.
Figure 12: Ideal functionality FAgg.
Lemma 1. Assume that the aggregate-sum is ϵ-private. For the
regression models, the gradient ω on {Di }i ∈B and B ⊆ [m] with
|B| ≥ 2t does not leak any information about an honest user’s Di
with |Di | ≥ 1 for a coalition of up to (t − 1) users and the server,
where t = ⌈m3 ⌉.
Proof. For the linear and logistic regression, the local gradient
ωi on Di with size di can be written as
ωi =
( di∑
j=1
e(j),
di∑
j=1
e(j)x (j)1 , · · · ,
di∑
j=1
e(j)x (j)n
)
where e(j) = (h(θ ,x(j))−y(j)) and h is a linear or logistic regression
function. The gradientω = (ω0, · · · ,ωn ) on the dataset {Di }i ∈B
is given by
ω =
∑
i ∈B
ωi =
( ∑
i ∈B
di∑
j=1
e(j),
∑
i ∈B
di∑
j=1
e(j)x (j)1 , · · · ,
∑
i ∈B
di∑
j=1
e(j)x (j)n
)
.
The first component ofω can bewritten asω0 =
∑
i ∈B\C
∑di
j=1 e
(j)+∑
i ∈C
∑di
j=1 e
(j). For a set of corrupted users of size up to t − 1, the
number of terms in
∑
i ∈B\C
∑di
j=1 e
(j) is ∑i ∈B\C di , and similarly
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for other components. In worst case, when |Di | = 1 and the num-
ber of the honest users in B\C is at least t ≥ ϵ , the gradient leaks
no information aboutω due to ϵ-privacy of the aggregate. □
Proofs of Theorems 3 and 4. Below we provide the proofs of the
security theorems of the training protocols.
Proof of Theorem 3. We will prove the security of the proto-
cols in (FSLG,FAgg)-hybrid model using the standard hybrid argu-
ment. For πLinTrain and πLogTrain, the ideal functionality FSLG is
replaced by FLinSLG and FLogSLG, respectively.
We provide a construction of a simulator through a sequence of
hybrids which are constructed by subsequent modifications and
argue that every two subsequent hybrids are computationally indis-
tinguishable. The simulator S runs the adversary A internally and
provides the corrupted users inputs, and can emulates the honest
parties’ inputs as the actual inputs of the honest parties are un-
known. S has access to FSLG and FAgg. We denote by C the set of
corrupted parties and |C| ≤ t .
Hyb 0: This hybrid is a random variable corresponding to the joint
view of A in the real-world execution of the protocol.
Hyb 1: This hybrid is identically same as the previous one, except the
key agreement phase. For the honest users inU0\C, instead
of using the DH key agreement algorithm (KeyAgree),S uses
a pair of uniformly random keys for encryption/decryption
and one-time key generation. The Decisional Diffie-Hellman
assumption ensures that this hybrid is indistinguishable from
the previous one.
Hyb 2: Note thatXsum = XCsum +X
U1\C
sum whereXCsum is the sum of
the corrupted user inputs and XU1\Csum is the sum of the hon-
est users inputs. When Xsum =⊥, S aborts. In this hybrid,
S samples {Zu }u ∈U1\C such that
∑
u ∈U1\C Zu = Xsum . In-
stead of sending {Xu }u ∈U1\C as inputs for the honest users,S sends {Zu }u ∈U1\C as inputs to FAgg. As |U1\C| ≥ t , the
ϵ-privacy of the aggregation-sum ensures that the distribu-
tions {Zu }u ∈U1\C and {Xu }u ∈U1\C are identical, where the
number of inputs in the sum of the honest users’ inputs is
ℓt ≥ ϵ . Thus, this hybrid is indistinguishable from Hyb 1.
Hyb 3: In this hybrid, we change the encryption of θ by E(0). A’s
view in the real-world execution of the protocol contains
E(θ ). The semantic security of the encryption scheme en-
sures that this hybrid is indistinguishable from the previous
one.
Hyb 4: In this hybrid, for each honest user, the inputDu is sampled
as D ′u s.t. Zu =
( ∑ |D′u |
j=1 x
(j)′
1 , · · · ,
∑ |D′u |
j=1 x
(j)′
n
2)
, u ∈ U1\C.
Note that S uses the knowledge of {Zu } in Hyb 2. S con-
structs V by randomly choosing M users with M ≥ 2t . S
aborts if |V| < M . For each honest user in V\C, S sends
D ′u and θ to FSLG and receives a random share s′u . S runs
polynomial-many FSLG and obtains {s′u }u ∈V\C . A’s view
in the real-world execution contains {su }u ∈V\C with su =
ωu + ru where {ru } is randomly generated. Thus, the distri-
bution {s′u }u ∈V\C is identically distributed to {su }u ∈V\C .
Thus, this hybrid is indistinguishable from Hyb 3.
Hyb 5: In this hybrid, as rsum = rCsum + r
V′′\C
sum , S emulates the
honest users’ inputs
{
r′u
}
u ∈V′′\C such that
∑
u ∈V′′\C r′u =
∑
u ∈V′′\C ru = r
V′′\C
sum , where
{
ru
}
u ∈V′′\C is randomly
distributed, and for the honest users inV ′\(V ′′\C), it ran-
domly samples arbitrary values and sends all to FAgg. Note
thatω = ωC+ωV′′\C = ∑u ∈C(su−ru )+∑u ∈V′′\C(su−ru ),
and the number of honest users in V ′′\C is |V ′′\C| =
M − δ ≥ ρ. Therefore,ωV′′\C is the sum of at least ρ · ℓ = ϵ
inputs. In the real-world execution, any leakage about an
individual su can happen from the execution of the ag-
gregation protocol with a negligible probability. The secu-
rity of the aggregation protocol and the ϵ-privacy of the
aggregate-sum ensures that the distributions
{
r′u
}
u ∈V′′\C
and
{
ru
}
u ∈V′′\C are identical and so do
{
ωu
}
u ∈V′′\C and{
ω ′u
}
u ∈V′′\C with
∑
u ∈V′′\C ω ′u = ωV
′′\C emulated by S.
Therefore, this hybrid is indistinguishable from the previous
one.
Hyb 6: We repeat Hyb 3 to Hyb 5 sequentially (R − 1) times (poly-
nomial many times), and it is easy to observe that each sub-
sequent modification of the hybrids is indistinguishable, by
applying the above arguments.
This concludes the construction of the simulator. Thus, the output of
the simulator is computationally indistinguishable from the output
of the real-world execution of the protocol. Hence the proof follows.
□
Proof of Theorem 4. This can be proved by constructing a
simulator in a similar way, as of Theorem 3. We only empha-
size the main behavior changes of the simulator and omit other
details. Since the adversary corrupts only the set of users in C,
the joint view of the adversary, after the data scaling phase, con-
tains µ and σ , which involves the honest users inputs. S emu-
lates the honest users’ (inU1\C) inputs D ′u such that
∑
u ∈CWu +∑
u ∈U1\C Yu = d1 · µ where Yu =
( ∑ |D′u |
j=1 x
(j)′
1 , · · · ,
∑ |D′u |
j=1 x
(j)′
n
)
andWu =
( ∑ |Du |
j=1 x
(j)
1 , · · · ,
∑ |Du |
j=1 x
(j)
n
)
and uses the true inputs
Du for the corrupted users u ∈ C, and these inputs are used in the
rest of the simulation. Note that in the training phase no output is
received by the users in C. The simulator can use a dummy vector
for the sum of the honest users’ local gradientωV′′\C . □
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